转眼间偶也到本命年了. 大家都不小咯! 偶要努力健身,永葆青春, 哦也!

熊熊跟我说要当我小孩干爹. 偶那个感动啊!!  其他有此想法的人不要再打主意了.  干妈找谁当呢? 哈哈.  算算看, 高中同学都认识了7年半了! 好朋友一直陪我走了这么长, 偶感激.

高盛的背景调查终于结束了.  希望搬家费早点到来!

祝大家在新的一年, 健康幸福, 都发大财!

由于本本装不了LIVE WRITER, 这里就拖了好久没写.

回来的飞机还算顺利,没有延误. 有电影看. 加航的电影是我坐过的最多的. 好多选择, 有几十个, 还有好多新片. 还有电视节目看.  偶一激动, 没怎么睡觉,连看了以下:

The nanny diary (scarlet Johansson) 演的,去曼哈顿富人家做保姆的故事. 看看人家upper east side的富人家哈哈.

The heartbreak kid 搞笑的喜剧

superbad 青少年捣乱片

stardust 神话片

还看了the office, how  i met your mother, little Britain abroad等电视. 结果就是开始上学上班的前三天时差倒不过来. 带的卤鸡蛋和桔子在飞机上吃得很爽,下次要多带点. 飞机餐太难吃了!

学校有博士GG俩人,双双被抽查, 被迫交代出牛肉干, 香肠,卤牛肉等等肉制品N斤. 由于认错态度好,只没收没有罚款. 我私藏的牛肉干没有被查哈哈哈.

上班的地方比较无聊. UPS的总部在车距5分钟的地方, 比较豪华. IT被分配到其他地方的一个楼, 只租了一层,设施简陋. 经理是个香港女人, 说一月份总结,二月分做计划, 估计到三四月份才有实际的活给偶干.   偶呆了俩个星期,只做了6个报表, 交给我一个做使用某网站说明的任务. 老板下个月出差, 估计我下个月只有写这个PPT的活. 汗!!  可是没有GYM,没有街逛, 没活干比有活干更痛苦!
这个UPS,至少是IT这块,全是老年人. 我在整个楼看见一个20几岁的. 工作老龄化. 上午, 小餐厅全是团坐着吃早饭聊天的人. 中午90%人带饭. 要知道若是在城里是不多见的. IT楼里没有食堂(!!), 要是出去吃就要开车. 我懒得开,怕迷路. 天天带饭. 生活跟老年人无异.  这些人的话题就是剪草坪, 装修房子, 儿女怎么样. 汗.
我们没有台机,只有显示器和键盘. 发个笔记本. 我的是退伍的IBM T40, 人家的都是新的. 八过偶也不管, 电脑慢八是我的错.

LG原来在网上买了个红手表, 拿到实物发现所谓的钻一点都不闪, 八好看. 退了. 偶又订了JUICY COUTURE的红表, 今天收到实物,很米很开心哈哈. 而且比第一个便宜. 买红手表这件事总算是圆满结束了.

偶去商场看手表的时候,顺便去YY了一下包和鞋. 试了几双MANOLO, 超轻超高超舒服.  还试试PRADA包,(真是厚脸皮!) PRADA这两季出的大皮包都很好看. 手感很好.    NND, 等偶的搬家费发下来,一定要去买双鞋.

商场换季大减价, 偶自己只买了件两件, 因为实在是没有我的号. 奋不顾身帮老公抢购无数. 便宜得不可思议. 比如老公的一条裤子不到10块钱.   资本主义减价好!

最近股市跌, 新闻媒体天天就炒RECESSION. 我觉得还是社会主义控制新闻媒体好. 资本主义媒体惟恐天下不乱.

周六过生日,准备到atlantic city逛逛. 太远的地方没时间去啊!

今天土人我跟陈蓉去德基LV逛了一圈。 土人没进去过。斗胆进了那个老重的门。本身对它家的包就没有好感。 摸了一个红皮夹，那个手感差的啊，跟硬塑料样的。老花的皮夹，粗啊。 为什么那么多人买这个摸得一点都不爽的牌子？八懂。

包没看到什么，看中了这只表。 苦苦寻找的红表。钻闪得还蛮美的。 小姐根本不来搭理我们（一看就不是来花钱的，汗）。问了下价格，4万九。怪怪。

美国网上卖5250，划下来不到四万。本人一瞬间迷惑了，心动了。 神经过后觉得不值。 四万我去买LV的表做啥？

假设有钱没事做，LV唯一值得买的就是旅行箱。那个老大的KEEPALL旅行袋，在机场传送带上看到，人造革结实耐磨！

ofuon ：

上衣两件

裙子一条

针织衫一件

（购物小姐已经认识我了，汗）

思加图鞋一双

和宣，陆到高中转了转。 没有去看老师。 去的时候是周六，以为保安会拦住我们。结果当天科技大自主招生，好多闲杂人员，进去畅通无阻。

原来的澡堂变成了二食堂，不知道一米九的澡堂大叔现在在哪。原来我们住过的两个宿舍都成了男生宿舍。 怀疑女生去树人住了。

有两个什么IB班（international 啥啥），参见照片里窗子上贴幼稚素描的一张。 貌似是出国班。门口还弄了几个locker。教室里有电脑，小班教学。版报还是英文的。

现在的高三十一是葛翠兵教~

多了一个教育超市。

我们去的时候是下午，同学们还在补课，有的在考试。 看到一张变态的表格：午间自习巡逻表。 MS现在小孩12：20-1：30要在教室上自习。 幸好我早生了几年。。。 高三宣传栏展出优秀作业,物理历史政治等。。。

后门不开了。后门的小馆子都倒闭了。

在校园的宣传栏里，占宝的作品随处可见。心惊肉跳啊！

最近大吃大喝，已经有长胖的趋向，等回去再运动波~

上次录像的人是WHO？ 把录像发给偶看看啊

昨天收获：

大衣一件

西装一套

衬衫一件

（以上全部OFUON）

今天: 斯加图鞋一双

在德基看到TOYS R US， 中文名记不得了。 惊叹啊！ 之前还想到国内没有什么大型的玩具商店。 TOYS R US在美国基本属于垄断，到处都有暴大的商店（一个商店跟偶们一个大商场差不多大）。 在国内居然卖得和在美国一样贵，甚至更贵。 随便一个LEGO模型就好几百。 水枪也要好几十。 会翻跟头的跳跳虎居然卖600，美国才小几十。 中国人怎么买的起嘛？ 很多带小孩的是只玩不买的。

再次感受到资本主义的侵略。

CK的烂外套居然敢卖6400，晕倒。米国60刀俩件男士衬衫。

今天聊天结果是，聪明努力比不上家里有钱。

本人坐了无数小时的飞机，再转沪宁破烂巴士，终于到家了。

坐的是加航。 土人我还没去过加拿大。结果发现加拿大人动作慢，办事效率低。首先到了机场，6点的飞机，4点多air canada还没人在柜台，磨蹭磨蹭。 在多伦多转机，下飞机我第一个反应是，没人？ 整个大厅就俩三个人。 汗，地广人稀啊。 东转西转，一边走一边想如果不认识英语法语的人怎么办--没人带路。 转机的边防只有俩个官员，大多窗口都是空的。 在候机厅终于有了点人气。 此时开始下雪，偶真是霉啊！推迟20分钟上机。

上了机，半天还不走，说是多媒体系统坏了，大家看不了电影，找人来修。一修就修了一个小时， 最后说，修不好，还是走吧。 但是呢，下雪，要帮飞机除冰，又除了一个小时。 我的天，这些人不知道统筹分配？ 不能一边修一边除？ 好不容易除好，飞机开始动了，跑道又要除雪。 最后推迟了三小时才走。

飞机人不多，还可以躺着睡睡，但是没有电影看还是很无聊的。 我看完当天的wall street journal，又玩了玩DS，小睡+发呆。

每次坐飞机都觉得，空姐不是人干的。 累死了还要穿皮鞋，吃不好休息不好。

之前没有接触过加拿大人，这次听出口音。 他们说法语的时候和法国人感觉不一样，硬生生的。 偶在多伦多机场买报纸，美元1.5的华尔街时报，问我要2.5--难道是因为美元跌了？

本次皮肤护理比以往都有成效，以前再怎么涂都是干+油。 这次我用了facial wipe，清洁又滋润，再涂上眼霜加面霜。 不停在涂。 飞机上的空气害死人！ 不用洗面奶的原因是，厕所的水一点点小，不能洗干净。还有这次特别注意的是窗外的紫外线，听说特别伤皮肤，因为没有隔离嘛。 所以一定不要开着窗，大晒特晒，望呆。

陆文婷RP爆发，免费坐了商务舱，郁闷啊！！

昨天和熊熊聊天. 偶说我不牛,他说那什么叫牛. 偶想起前两天在wall street journal上看的文章, 觉得这俩个人才是真正的牛. 在网上找来原文分享一下.

给没兴趣看的人介绍下. 八月美国subprime mortgage 危机. 各家投行都亏了不少,一些小银行倒闭. 有几家大投行Q3赚得是负数. 偶知道CS赚了十亿,较往年少了很多. GS还是赚了二十多. 这篇文章就是讲为啥赚了-俩个trader有先见之明. 提一下,这几位牛人玩credit-default swaps,保住了公司的钱. 就是俺以后要做的东西.还是很exciting的.

偶做不了大牛, 因为偶不敢打几十亿的赌,所以也赚不了五百万的BONUS. (哭!)

How Goldman Won Big
On Mortgage Meltdown

A Team's Bearish Bets
Netted Firm Billions;
A Nudge From the CFO

By KATE KELLY
December 14, 2007; Page A1

The subprime-mortgage crisis has been a financial catastrophe for much of Wall Street. At Goldman Sachs Group Inc., thanks to a tiny group of traders, it has generated one of the biggest windfalls the securities industry has seen in years.

The group's big bet that securities backed by risky home loans would fall in value generated nearly $4 billion of profits during the year ended Nov. 30, according to people familiar with the firm's finances. Those gains erased $1.5 billion to $2 billion of mortgage-related losses elsewhere in the firm. On Tuesday, despite a terrible November and some of the worst market conditions in decades, analysts expect Goldman to report record net annual income of more than $11 billion.

Goldman's trading home run was blasted from an obscure corner of the firm's mortgage department -- the structured-products trading group, which now numbers about 16 traders. Two of them, Michael Swenson, 40 years old, and Josh Birnbaum, 35, pushed Goldman to wager that the subprime market was heading for trouble. Their boss, mortgage-department head Dan Sparks, 40, backed them up during heated debates about how much money the firm should risk. This year, the three men are expected to be paid between $5 million and $15 million apiece, people familiar with the matter say.

Under Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman has stood out on Wall Street for its penchant for rolling the dice with its own money. The upside of that approach was obvious in the third quarter: Despite credit-market turmoil, Goldman earned $2.9 billion, its second-best three-month period ever. Mr. Blankfein is set to be paid close to $70 million this year, according to one person familiar with the matter.

Goldman's success at wringing profits out of the subprime fiasco, however, raises questions about how the firm balances its responsibilities to its shareholders and to its clients. Goldman's mortgage department underwrote collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, complex securities created from pools of subprime mortgages and other debt. When those securities plunged in value this year, Goldman's customers suffered major losses, as did units within Goldman itself, thanks to their CDO holdings. The question now being raised: Why did Goldman continue to peddle CDOs to customers early this year while its own traders were betting that CDO values would fall? A spokesman for Goldman Sachs declined to comment on the issue.

The structured-products trading group that executed the winning trades isn't involved in selling CDOs minted by Goldman, a task handled by others. Its principal job is to "make a market" for Goldman clients trading various financial instruments tied to mortgage-backed securities. That is, the group handles clients' buy and sell orders, often stepping in on the other side of trades if no other buyer or seller is available.

The group also has another mission: If it spots opportunity, it can trade Goldman's own capital to make a profit. And when it does, it doesn't necessarily have to share such information with clients, who may be making opposite bets. This year, Goldman's traders did a brisk business handling trades for clients who were bullish on the subprime-mortgage-securities market. At the same time, they used Goldman's money to bet that that market would fall.

Tight Leash

Financial firms have good reason to keep a tight leash on proprietary traders. In 1995, bad bets by Nicholas Leeson, a young trader, led to $1.4 billion in losses and the collapse of Barings PLC. Last year, the hedge fund Amaranth Advisors shut down after a young Canadian trader lost more than $6 billion on natural-gas trades. But big trading wins such as George Soros's 1992 bet against the British pound, which netted more than $1 billion for his hedge fund, tend to be talked about for years.

The subprime trading gains notched by Messrs. Birnbaum and Swenson and their Goldman associates are large by recent Wall Street standards. Traders at Deutsche Bank AG and Morgan Stanley also bet against the subprime-mortgage market this year, but in each case, their gains were essentially wiped out because their firms underestimated how far the markets would fall. New York hedge-fund company Paulson & Co. also turned a considerable profit on the subprime meltdown this year, as did Hayman Capital Partners, a Dallas-based hedge-fund firm, say people familiar with the matter.

As recently as a year ago, few on Wall Street thought that the market for home loans made to risky borrowers, known as subprime mortgages, was heading for disaster. At that point, Goldman was bullish on bonds backed by such loans.

Hashing Out Risk

Last December, Mr. Sparks, a longtime trader of bond-related products, was named head of Goldman's 400-person mortgage department. That gave him a seat on the firm's risk committee, which numbers about 30 and meets weekly to hash out the firm's risk profile. It also gave him authority over the structured-products trading group, which then had just eight traders and was run jointly by Mr. Swenson and David Lehman, 30, a former Deutsche Bank trader.

Mr. Swenson, known as Swenny on the trading desk, is a former Williams College hockey player with four children and an acid wit. A veteran trader of asset-backed securities, he joined Goldman in 2000. In late 2005, he helped persuade Mr. Birnbaum, a Goldman veteran, to join the group. Mr. Birnbaum had developed and traded a new security tied to mortgage rates.

Mr. Swenson and Mr. Sparks, then No. 2 in the mortgage department, wanted Mr. Birnbaum to try his hand at trading related to the first ABX index, which was scheduled to launch in January 2006. Because securities backed by subprime mortgages trade privately and infrequently, their values are hard to determine. The ABX family of indexes was designed to reflect their values based on instruments called credit-default swaps. These swaps, in essence, are insurance contracts that pay out if the securities backed by subprime mortgages decline in value. Such swaps trade more actively, with their values rising and falling based on market sentiments about subprime default risk.

Messrs. Swenson and Sparks told Mr. Birnbaum the ABX was going to be a hot product, according to people with knowledge of their pitch.

They were right. On the first day of trading, Goldman netted $1 million in trading profits, people familiar with the matter say. But the index was tough to trade. In comparison to huge markets like Treasury bonds, there wasn't much buying and selling. That meant that Mr. Swenson's team nearly always had to use Goldman's capital to complete trades for clients looking to buy or sell.

Signs of Weakness

Last December, David Viniar, Goldman's chief financial officer, gave the group a big push, suggesting that it adopt a more-bearish posture on the subprime market, according to people familiar with his instructions. During a discussion with Mr. Sparks and others, Mr. Viniar noted that Goldman had big exposure to the subprime mortgage market because of CDOs and other complex securities it was holding, these people say. Emerging signs of weakness in the market, meant that Goldman needed to hedge its bets, the group concluded, these people say.

Mr. Swenson and his traders began shorting certain slices of the ABX, or betting against them, by buying credit-default swaps. At that time, new subprime mortgages still were being pumped out at a rapid clip, and gloom hadn't yet descended on the market. As a result, the swaps were relatively cheap.

Still, trading volume was thin, so it took months for the group to accumulate enough swaps to fully hedge Goldman's exposure to the subprime market. By February, Goldman had built up a sizable short position, and was poised to profit from the subprime meltdown.

The timing was nearly perfect. Goldman's bets were focused on an ABX index that reflects the value of a basket of securities that came to market in early 2006, known as the 06-2 index. Goldman bet that the riskiest portion of that index -- a sub-index that reflects the value of the slices of the securities with the lowest credit ratings -- would plunge in value. This January, as concerns about subprime mortgages grew, that sub-index dropped from about 95 to below 90. The traders handling the ABX trades were sitting on big profits.

Like other Wall Street firms, Goldman weighs its financial risk by calculating its average daily "value at risk," or VaR. It's meant to be a measure of how much money the firm could lose under adverse market conditions. Because the ABX had become so volatile, the VaR connected to the trades was soaring.

Goldman's co-president, Gary Cohn, who oversees the firm's trading business, became a frequent visitor, as did the firm's risk managers. More than once, Mr. Sparks was summoned to Mr. Blankfein's office to discuss the market. Goldman's top executives understood the group's strategy, say people with knowledge of the matter, but were uncompromising about the VaR. They demanded that risk be cut by as much as 50%, these people say.

Messrs. Swenson and Birnbaum, however, argued that the mortgage market was heading down, and Goldman should take full advantage by maintaining large short positions, people familiar with the matter say.

One day in late February, with the riskiest portion of the 06-2 index heading toward 60, the discussion about what to do grew heated, these people say. Mr. Birnbaum argued that Goldman would be leaving money on the table by unwinding some of the trades his group had used to bet on the mortgage market's decline.

"This is the wrong price" to close out the positions, Mr. Birnbaum snapped at a colleague assigned to help reduce risk, slamming down his phone receiver, these people say. He was overruled.

In March and April, the risky portion of the 06-2 index, which had taken a beating in February, bounced back from near 60 into the mid-70s. By then, the CDO underwriting business, which had been lucrative for Goldman, Merrill Lynch & Co. and other Wall Street firms, was slowing dramatically. Potential buyers had grown worried about the market.

Thanks to the wager that the ABX index would fall, Goldman's mortgage department earned several hundred million dollars during the first quarter, say people familiar with the matter. But the traders had unwound that bet in the weeks that followed. That left Goldman unhedged against further carnage, a worrisome situation for the second quarter.

In late April, Mr. Sparks, the mortgage-department chief, met with Mr. Cohn, the trading head, Mr. Viniar, the chief financial officer, and a couple of other senior executives. "We've got a big problem," Mr. Sparks told them as they paged through a handout listing the declining values of Goldman's CDO portfolio, according to people with knowledge of the meeting. Prices were heading straight down, he told them. He suggested that Goldman cancel a number of pending CDO deals, these people say, and sell whatever it could of the firm's roughly $10 billion in CDOs and related securities -- probably at a loss.

Into the Red

Led by Mr. Lehman, the co-head of the structured-products trading group, Goldman began selling off the majority of its CDO holdings. The losses pushed the mortgage group into the red for the second quarter.

By then, the subprime-mortgage market was cratering. Dozens of lenders had filed for bankruptcy protection, and legions of subprime borrowers were losing their homes. At Bear Stearns Cos., two internal hedge funds that had invested in risky portions of CDOs and other securities were struggling. Merrill and Citigroup Inc., among others, were sitting on billions of dollars in depreciating mortgage holdings.

Although it had become more expensive to wager against the ABX index, Messrs. Swenson and Birnbaum got a green light to once again ratchet up the firm's bet that securities backed by subprime mortgages would fall further. In July, the riskiest portion of the index plunged.

No Time for Breaks

The structured-products traders were working long hours. Mr. Swenson would leave his home in Northern New Jersey in time to hit the gym and be at his desk by 7:30 a.m. When Mr. Birnbaum arrived from his Manhattan loft, they'd begin executing large trades on behalf of clients. There was no time for breaks. They took breakfast and lunch at their desks -- for Mr. Swenson, the same chicken-and-vegetable salad every day from a nearby deli; for Mr. Birnbaum, an egg-white sandwich for breakfast, a chicken or turkey sandwich for lunch.

Mr. Sparks, the mortgage chief, climbed into his car at 5:30 each morning for the drive in from New Canaan, Conn. To calm his nerves, he'd stop by the gym in Goldman's downtown building to briefly jump rope and lift weights. Sometimes he worked past midnight, arriving home exhausted. He canceled a family ski trip to Wyoming. Although he loved to attend Texas A&M football games and owned a second home near the university, he decided not to join his wife and two children on more than one trip. (Mr. Sparks is a major donor to the university's athletic program.)

By late July, the Bear Stearns funds had collapsed and rumors were circulating of multibillion-dollar CDO losses at Merrill. Goldman was raking in profits.

But once again, concern was growing about VaR, the all-important measure of risk. At one point in July, senior executives called another meeting to demand the mortgage traders pull back, according to people familiar with the matter. The traders agreed.

Ratcheting Back

Around Labor Day, Mr. Birnbaum was asked to ratchet back one of his short positions by $250 million, according to Hayman Capital managing partner Kyle Bass, a client who had similar positions at the time. Mr. Bass says he made $100 million by relieving Goldman of that particular short bet. "It appeared to me that [the traders] constantly fought a VaR battle with the firm once the market started to break," says Mr. Bass.

In the first three quarters of its fiscal year, Goldman's VaR rose 38%, ending that period at $139 million per day, an all-time high, regulatory filings indicate.

During the third quarter ended Aug. 30, the structured-products trading group made more than $1 billion, say people knowledgeable about its performance. That helped the mortgage department notch record quarterly earnings of $800 million, these people say.

The subprime market continued to deteriorate through the fall. Both Merrill and Citigroup announced massive write-downs connected to the subprime mess, and their chief executive officers resigned.

Goldman pressed forward with its bearish bets on the ABX index, people familiar with its strategy say. In October, Goldman's mortgage unit moved from one downtown Manhattan office building to another. Despite their stellar year, traders were crowded into a low-ceiling floor where 150 employees shared one small men's room.

In late November, Mr. Sparks summoned Messrs. Birnbaum and Swenson to his office for separate visits. He thanked each trader for what he had done for the firm.

But there has been no time to relax. Two weeks into Goldman's new fiscal year, credit markets are looking bleaker than ever. Already, analysts are trimming their estimates of how much Goldman and other Wall Street firms will make in the coming year.

UPS打电话来问什么时候去签字. HR是个老女人,好心但是实在太韶.  屁大点事能打两次电话发两封邮件.  说鉴于偶已经大四,给的钱稍微多点 (和CS差不多,偶也满足了). 

我有五门课要做project或者presentation, 现在3个在进行时,两个还没开始.  这还不算期终考试.

上周去面了PROTIVITI, risk consulting firm. 从8点到4点. 早餐比较差,我只拿了瓶水. 那天一共有11个人. 一半是应聘实习的, 大多都是学金融会计之类做business auditing的.  学理的似乎只有偶一个. 先是听某MD做了个很无聊没水平的报告. 然后做了个比较弱智的游戏. 然后分成小组被带出去吃饭.

我原本还准备趁机小喝两杯(汗!), 谁知大家都喝水. 郁闷.  我们组去的是bobby flay开的馆子. 此人是烹饪频道比较有名的主持人, 以烧烤为主. 比较贵, 中饭我们6个人,没点酒,就花了200多. 口味还不错吧.  有个美籍印度人, 这大概可以称为我见过的最农的人了.  首先,大赞特赞环境如何好(也就是个中上环境吧). 然后看看菜单, 说好多不认识的东西. 我点了red snapper(一种鱼),他说, 那是啥? 我说是鱼. 他说,肉是红的? 我晕.   超市里4块一磅没见过啊? 

随便点了一些开胃菜. 有一个是shrimp cocktail. (就是煮过的大虾子蘸酱, 很普遍的).  我们看他可怜,就让他吃.  此人来句,怎么吃? 晕! 剥了壳只剩尾巴的虾能怎么吃.  他问,先去尾巴再蘸酱还是先蘸再去尾巴.  旁边服务员笑死了,说, 蘸酱涂在脸上吃.

还有种种可笑的事就不提了. 偶还是要攒RP.

吃完饭就马不停蹄回来面试. 第一个面的是个男的 (怎么像废话). 先随便问了两句. 然后他提到以前在中国呆过几年. 偶们就大侃特侃了半个多小时. 北京啊上海啊香港啊. 他说不喜欢上海,因为外国人太多了(汗). 偶说,如果让我回国偶愿意,但是要US PAY, 拿国内工资活不了. 他也笑,说只认识过几个这样的人,他还羡慕呢.  这个面试基本上就是聊天了.

第二个面还是个男的. 这次问了点问题,讲了点正经事. 他说,是不可能从这边调人去中国的, 经济上不允许. 

去面只是去玩玩,接触接触不同行业的人.  做consulting跑来跑去太烦老. 而且据说一般都没有BONUS, 此公司算好的了,只有4%.(塞牙缝啊, 去了税就没几毛了).  而且没有健身房..

JPMorgan Chase是明天面.  偶对它本身没有好感. 他们很无聊的要做presentation. 发了22页的东西,里面都是某银行内部EMAIL. 要找出失误提出改造方法. 偶只看了2页,周末玩掉了.  于是决定不去了. BS我吧!

周五下午，微电子课发卷子。 等到最后老师说有个人没写名字，ID号xxxx。我一听是我的号嘛，我怎么会没写名字? 正在迟疑中，某男站起来拿卷子。老师看看他说，是你吗？最高分啊？ 此男一看，说不是。 最后是我的。糗啊，没写名字！

下了课进城。和实习的狐朋狗友小聚。去了一个法式+德式餐馆。 我不喜欢喝啤酒的。小姐推荐了一种就尝试了一下。怪怪，和普通的真得很不一样。一点也不苦，泡泡很细。 德国名字不记得了。 德国香肠很好吃，鸭子烧得也好。其他人点的菜偶也都尝了一下，吃得撑死了。 就是蔬菜分量很少,怪不得德国出啤酒肚啊。
有人留在公司，有人即将要走。大家各奔前程。实习的日子还是很有趣的，唉！

 这周面的jp morgan。没有新意的银行面试。 Accenture和强生偶偷懒没去。 我不想做consulting；后者是因为太远了（懒得自己开车去）。 下周就要签GS了。 想了最后似乎也没有更好的去处。

下面就要开始找下学期的part time。 下学期课少，我是闲不下来的。

强烈推荐一个电影Harold and Kumar go to White Castle. http://imdb.com/title/tt0366551/ 实在是太太好笑了. 讲的是一个美籍韩裔和一个美籍印裔是室友，两人某晚突然想吃white castle.一整晚经历各种稀奇古怪的事终于在一大早吃到了，一人吃了30个（汗）。 white castle是一个快餐牌子。 小汉堡直径只有10厘米左右，一般一次吃好几个。 很好叉。比麦当劳好吃多了。 但是不是到处都有。 这两个人住在新泽西hoboken，去了好几个town才找到。 对于我这个在hoboken的人特别有意义，他们去的地方我都经过啊。 (两个主角一个上的伯克利一个上UCLA，汗)

今天做了葱油饼。正宗！好吃！ 有点烦！